Future, Present, & Past:



Speculative
~~ Giving itself latitude and leisure to take any premise or inquiry to its furthest associative conclusion.
Critical~~ Ready to apply, to itself and its object, the canons of reason, evidence, style, and ethics, up to their limits.
Traditional~~ At home and at large in the ecosystem of practice and memory that radically nourishes the whole person.

Oυδεὶς άμουσος εἰσίτω

Saturday, January 2, 2010

Philosophy between the lines


Esotericism: how one understands the issue depends very greatly on the degree to which one identifies or distinguishes between politics and religion. Philosophy early on had to fight on two fronts. In its contest with religion it wound up arguing that it (philosophy) ultimately aimed at the same realities as religion; it declared in syllogism what religion declared in symbols. Religion rejoined that philosophy is impiety; that speaking of religion as Symbol amounts to abolishing it; yet religion has also sometimes let itself be persuaded, if it could do so on its own terms. Philosophy, in its conciliatory moods, has always been at pains to avoid too condescending a tone. In its non-conciliatory moods it is at pains to avoid sounding too accommodating. The latter moods have (so far) been rarer.

To politics, on the other hand, philosophy argued that it (philosophy) could be an asset; it could define the conditions of the ideal state. Even if such conditions might never be wholly attainable, still the interests of philosophy and politics were compatible. Sometimes politics was condescending to philosophy, and occasionally it was flattered by it (which religion rarely was); for its part, philosophy had to alternate between playing court counselor, or staying out of the way. So far no one has ever tried to force the philosophers to rule.

Philosophy’s struggle with religion was begun by philosophy; indeed, it was practically an inter-religious dispute at first. Its struggle with politics was begun by politics; philosophy in fact looked more or less like a new and dangerous religious sect to the politicians. In the trial of Socrates, politics commandeered the objections of religion and made use of them—playing one sect against another; and since then the two fronts have always seemed to be fronts of a single war. It is even a possible political position to dispute that there is any independent religious position—independent from politics—at all.

In our own era this is all too common. The default position amongst Western intelligentsia has tended to be that power is the fundamental category to which everything else reduces. If the ancient church fathers argue against Gnostic practices, this (it is assumed) must have been because Gnosticism threatened their power. (This is the standard account more or less universally accepted from Elaine Pagels, despite whatever differences scholars may have with her interpretations of Gnostic doctrines). If the Left wants to establish a single-payer healthcare system in the U.S., or the Right strives against the effort, this is taken in either case be a move to consolidate power. Of course, the power-motive is usually overtly ascribed only to the other side; I am moved by pursuit of the truth or the best policy; you are opposing me out of will-to-power. But no one is really taken in by this sort of bad faith; it eats away at one
s account of ones own motives too, and beneath the protests is the cynical axiom that the Good or the True is What You Can Get Away With.

The establishment version of this stance is well represented by Richard Rorty; the counterculture ‘pop’ version is Robert Anton Wilson. I’ve learned a good deal from both of them, so I don’t wish to seem to merely belittle this relativism; but it is clearly untenable by itself. No one is capable of believing this line for more than two or three seconds. And yet as a meme, it is astonishingly long-lived; it goes back, as you have already recognized, to the Sophists (as depicted by Plato anyway): Thrasymachus, Callicles, and so on, arguing that the only nomos is the will of the strong, and Vae victis. This is the infamous argument the Athenian delegation gave to the Melians.

If you believe that everything reduces to power, then of course religion is the ultimate crime and alibi, the best cloak for power, because it gets at people at the most intimate existential level. But (on this assumption) this intimate existential level has no legitimacy in itself; it is simply a weak spot in the human psyche. If however you dispute this equation, then whatever the evils capable of being carried out under the auspices of religion, there remains the real concern of religion—precisely with this existential core, what Tillich calls Ultimate Concern. (Of course for Cynical Reason, there can be no Ultimate Concern; there is only the appetite of the moment). If you do grant this, then you have pried apart politics and religion. And depending upon whether this gap exists or not, you will read the notion of philosophical esotericism differently.

This, of course, assuming you believe in esotericism at all—a separate question, but one I am not addressing here. Leo Strauss has laid out the classic case for holding that ancient, medieval, renaissance and early modern philosophers wrote esoterically, and while I have some quarrels with his take, I essentially am persuaded. I can detail some of his claims in other posts, but anyone unfamiliar with him will do far better to read him directly.

I believe, however, that Strauss conflates the struggles philosophy conducts with religion and with politics, so that the former becomes a function of the latter. Strauss sees philosophy making cosmetic concessions to religion for the sake of a political settlement (in order that the philosopher may pursue philosophy unmolested). I see a further layer. Strauss does recognize philosophy’s claim to seek the truth of religion, the truth which religion must pursue in mythical or symbolic or otherwise inexact terms. But his dour conclusion seems often to be that this is itself a cover; that philosophy’s ultimate conclusions are indeed what the city suspects—a bleak nihilism, a picture of a cosmos empty of reason or purpose. It was, Strauss thinks, this vision which was too terrible to be shared with the polis, and had to be carefully guarded and made available only to the student who was ready.

My conclusion is otherwise. Ancient philosophers were more than witnesses to a progressive critique of religion; they were its instigators. They knew very well that this critique of religion was inexorable. Friends of truth, they had no desire to veer from it. But in addition to the concerns Strauss perceives (lest a bracing truth be revealed too quickly), philosophers were motivated by something more: a desire to keep the critique from taking too much; from decaying into (what we would call) nihilism. This aim was not political but philosophical: the truth was indeed what religion wanted to express in its inchoate way, and as truth it needed to be preserved, precisely from the language that had hitherto kept it. One could say that this was not a cosmological but a moral truth—that philosophy aims at the cultivation of a disposition, not at a formulatable creed—but the case is in fact more subtle, for the very distinction between moral and cosmological is precisely a feature of the critique of religion, and one of the features philosophy suspects most of being “too much.”

In other words, I take the philosophers at their word when they say they are pursuing the same truths as religion; the melancholy conclusions one sometimes senses in Strauss that the truth is “too terrible” to be made generally known, I take to be either a stage along the philosophical way, or a projection of Strauss’ own modernity. Nonetheless, I am sure that Strauss is correct in claiming that philosophy writes “esoterically;” I contest only the aim, which is (I hold) to lead the student to philosophical insight, an insight that cannot be reached directly. Philosophy “argues” this way: because it is the only way. Or rather: there are many ways, but all of them are indirect. What this means is that esotericism is not incidental to philosophy or its historical situation. It is a strategy adopted out of neither convenience nor necessity; rather, it is of the essence of the realization at which philosophy aims.

In a letter to Ludwig Ficker, Wittgenstein writes concerning the Tractatus:

My work consists of two parts: of that which is under consideration here and of all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one.

4 comments:

  1. Part 1

    Let us first speak of Politics and Religion as it was when the Philosophers first appeared. The philosophers found both of these at the heart of the City, as its Nomos. That is, as the customary laws of our people. But there is a contest between these two. It is the question that Antigone asks. Which decides in the final instance? Thus Philosophy destroyed no initial equilibrium. The City at Peace is only preparing for another War. The real question is - does the City destroy itself or other cities...

    Nomos is One. But the exceptions are divided in two (priest, warrior) and they interpret it differently. Interpretation is where philosophy pitches its tent. Esotericism initially appears in order to speak 'Oneness' to those (I mean, of course, the exceptions) who are irrevocably cloven in two. We must never forget that esotericism is always (I should here type 'also') a very practical affair.

    Yes, Thrasymachus argues that 'the only nomos is the will of the strong', but when he realizes that this means no one needs listen to (or pay for) his speeches, he becomes quite docile. Thus the sophistic worshipers of power either change or they tend to be ignored and forgotten. (Except in times of transition, like ours, where they seem to be everywhere.) You imply that the cynics and the nihilists are the problem. (And they are now!) But we should not forget that the noblest exceptions are a problem too...

    Now, I certainly agree that there is a matter of 'Ultimate Concern', beyond any Nomos. But I also insist that every philosophical speech impacts Nomos and that the philosophers primary concern must be that. Why do I say 'must'? Because the 'Ultimate Concern' does not need the speech of the Philosopher. It is the City (always potentially at Civil War!) that needs it. Thus the philosopher inevitably puts the matter of 'Ultimate Concern' on the back burner while dealing with the matter of primary (perhaps I should say immediate) concern. (You will agree that there is no 'back-burner' for the Mystic.)

    You understand my point. Esotericism tries to restore (if you like, impose) Oneness to the City and this is what entitles philosophy to treat politics and religion as if they were the Same. They are not; but saying they are not does not help the cause.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Part 2

    Regarding Strauss, I lean towards the 'he is a nihilist' camp; without the hysteria that is usually associated with it. But one could say, in his defense, that Strauss is only discussing Religion as Nomos, - not Religion as 'Ultimate Concern'. How does one make this argument?

    The city (I mean every City) is sick. Thus the 'highest' conclusion it draws from philosophy is "that philosophy’s ultimate conclusions are indeed what the city suspects—a bleak nihilism, a picture of a cosmos empty of reason or purpose". But philosophy must convince the exceptions that the City is worth preserving. So, philosophy plays upon their native heroism and 'allows' them to play the role of supposedly anti-nihilistic heroes holding back nihilism by pretending to be faithful the Nomos of the City. ...Any port in a storm. And who knows, maybe Strauss reasoned like that.

    Thus I disagree with your conclusion. The City, and the human types (the cloven exceptions, and the 'herd') are going nowhere. Thus, when you say 'lest a bracing truth be revealed too quickly', I object because you imply that the exceptions can learn from (can be changed by) the truth. The Master of Strauss is Farabi. Farabi taught that Political Philosophy, as enunciated by Plato, was complete; and that the Metaphysical Philosophy of Aristotle had barely begun.

    Philosophy will forever be in the same city, I mean to say in the same predicament. So I disagree that philosophy envisions a 'true religion'. The matter of 'Ultimate Concern' is of no concern to the City. There must always be a 'false' Nomos tailored to the current times.

    Your penultimate paragraph concludes thusly:

    "I am sure that Strauss is correct in claiming that philosophy writes “esoterically;” I contest only the aim, which is (I hold) to lead the student to philosophical insight, an insight that cannot be reached directly. Philosophy “argues” this way: because it is the only way. Or rather: there are many ways, but all of them are indirect. What this means is that esotericism is not incidental to philosophy or its historical situation. It is a strategy adopted out of neither convenience nor necessity; rather, it is of the essence of the realization at which philosophy aims."

    I really do agree with this. From the viewpoint of the two or three genuinely gathered in philosophical thought this is certainly true. From the perspective of History this is false; and if pursued from this perspective it would destroy us all. When the philosopher writes for eternity (I mean in books meant to be read by an unknown future) he writes for the Nomos.

    Wittgenstein said, "My work consists of two parts: of that which is under consideration here and of all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one." The second part is indeed the important part.

    And it is never written...

    Joe

    PS. There is a limitation of 4096 characters and that is why I broke up the post.

    ReplyDelete
  3. Joe,

    I do not know whether the old philosophers envisioned either the herd or the exceptions being changed by the truth. I think the wisest must have realized that change happens when it happens, and cannot be constrained. In this, I think Heidegger pretty much got it right. But I maintain that they want to cultivate a disposition, an openness to realization.

    As you probably guess, I incline to a version of the "Unwritten Teachings" view of Plato, which holds that the Academy had a series of lessons (or, much more likely, spiritual exercises, and a common life-- a sort of "Rule of St Benedict") which were viewed as inherently oral, aural, and practical. There is a common thread of a certain kind of asceticism that runs from these thinkers all the way through the later Christian monastics. The more time I spend with Epictetus, the more he reminds me of someone like St. Benedict. Obviously I would have to hedge these comparisons in by a host of caveats if I was presenting it rigorously, and it's possible I would wind up qualifying them out of existence. But I see a perennial tension between philosophy and religion, not a simple critique that is ever finished. I would not say that philosophy aims at a "true religion," or a "true politics" for that matter; but it does aim to do what can be done from the side of humanity (since the side of the Truth must take care of itself, and can) to keep either religion or politics (or indeed art, or science, or the individual's eros for life) from their own worst excesses.

    Your point re. Antigone is very good. There never was an Edenic conflict-free state. I think Religion itself acknowledges this in a strange way, for its Eden is always *before*--in a realm of pre-memory. Philosophy is, as it were, the coming to consciousness of the break between pre-memory and history. (There is a reason why philosophy and history begin about the same time).

    As you might note from my more recent posts, one thing that preoccupies me is the twin question, how does philosophy ground (*not* 'arbitrate') the conversation between *different* religious, or political (or scientific, etc) discourses? This grounding I see in two different ways. First there is the workaday compromise-patching that must happen to keep the City from collapsing into war. That's the Nomos talking to itself. Then there is also the way that every dispute--what Lyotard calls the Differend, what Zizek calls the parallax-- opens onto the philosophical itself. And this in two ways, or a twin way: Content-wise, the questions eventually touch bottom-- reaching 'ultimate questions' like "why is there anything?" And, Process-wise, one reaches 'ultimate practices' re. which Wittgenstein says "here my spade is turned, & I am inclined to say, 'This is simply what I do.'" Here one gets to the question--What is happening as I am confronted by the opposition/agreement/indifference/etc. of the other person? (or of the materials, the context, etc). This is in some ways a much more elusive realm, and I am afraid starts to sound rather 'touchy-feely' as the disparagers would put it (and indeed it risks this). But see it like a koan. "What would two philosophers say to each other?"

    Sorry this comment is a little slapdash-- I write in haste.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Yes, the philosophers believe change (to the City) happens, but it is only the moderns who believe that change to the City can be based on philosophical Truth and not sub-philosophical myth. The 'disposition' you speak of is indeed cultivated because the philosophers must remain open to the possibility that their speeches will affect someone.

    As far as the supposed "Unwritten Teachings" Plato's Academy go, let's remember that no great philosopher came out of the Academy - ever. But it is these practices that lead, through however a circuitous route, to the neoplatonists (and Farabi). This line of descent, after being refreshed by the 're-discovery' of Aristotle, gave the philosophy of late antiquity its great value.

    Epictetus and Benedict, a fine observation. And there is indeed a tension between philosophy and religion/politics. Yes, Philosophy does strive, as you say, "to keep either religion or politics (or indeed art, or science, or the individual's eros for life) from their own worst excesses." Yes, and 'indeed' again. But you say that philosophy must tell the 'Truth' to do that.

    I say it spins the best available Myth out of pre-existent cloth. "There never was an Edenic conflict-free state." Nor will there ever be. But we both agree that, generally speaking, most historical situations can be improved. I say that the important thing in the these Myths is the pre-existing materials, that is, the Nomos of the City.

    So, I do not really believe that philosophy creates a new myth; rather it discovers it already in embryo in the City and then plays the appropriately 'philosophical' midwife. Thus I do not believe that Plato or Nietzsche made anything. Both discovered tendencies in their own time that they helped push along. They did not choose their times; and they did not, in any real sense, choose those embryonic tendencies.

    This is why I do not talk about the problems that beset Civilization (the World-City) today. It is only fashion.

    And when everyone shares the same fashion (the same myth) there will then be peace.

    Joe

    ReplyDelete