"If you think the realism vs. anti-realism debate is a “pseudo-problem,” then you’re a correlationist."
By this account (Harman's), I am certainly not. I think the debate in question is not a pseudo-problem but a mystery. One can think this in at least two possible ways. Possibly we are too stupid to understand the issue; our brains did not evolve to confront such metaphysical conundrums. This would be something akin to Colin McGinn's philosophy of consciousness. On the other hand, possibly the issue is irreducibly mysterious; it resists resolution by the very nature of its terms. My money is on option 2.
Incidentally, even Wittgenstein, while he may have used the term "pseudo-problem" a bit at a certain stage in his career (or at least contributed to the atmosphere that made this term welcome), regarded the "mistakes" that language could lead us into as far deeper than what is usually meant by this disparagement. For him, the purgation and self-examination involved in clearing up such "mistakes" was a struggle--one could justly say a spiritual struggle, if one did not fear (or care) about misappropriation of the adjective; and if at a certain moment the question seemed to "disappear," this did not make it a stupid mistake.
I do however think that "correlationism" is a persistent resolution to the debate that cannot be forsworn once and for all, anymore than can "metaphysics". In my ontology/epistemology (and I am suspicious of any too-rigid separation of these), any entity that could "think" the issue will wind up being correlationist; correlationism is, like geocentrism, how the world looks for a certain kind of situated consciousness.
If oxen and horses and lions had hands and were able to draw with their hands and do the same things as men, horses would draw the shapes of gods to look like horses and oxen to look like oxen, and each would make the gods' bodies have the same shape as they themselves had.This remark by Xenophanes, preserved for us by Clement of Alexandria (Miscellanies 5.110), did not mean that Xenophanes believed there were no gods; we know from other quotations (fragmentary though they are), in Clement and elsewhere, that Xenophanes held that "God is one, greatest among gods and men, not at all like mortals in body or thought," (Miscellanies 5.109); "All of him sees, all of him thinks, all of him hears," Sextus Empiricus quotes (Against the Mathematicians 9.144). In like manner, neither should we conclude that, the "human-world interface" being demystified, the question of the interface per se is now moot. The day we bridge the human-dolphin divide (or perhaps when a computer convinces us to ignore the machine-human divide) we will learn again that philosophy is not anthropology, but has only been so by accident, as it were.