tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post3638642145694396855..comments2024-01-05T01:21:21.702-08:00Comments on <center>SPECULUM CRITICUM TRADITIONIS</center>: A massive reaction formationskholiasthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comBlogger16125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-62315165466137860092012-11-08T07:54:25.871-08:002012-11-08T07:54:25.871-08:00Tim,
I'll leave the question of Bryant's...Tim, <br /><br />I'll leave the question of Bryant's motives and his tactics to one side, though I agree with your follow-up correction that he is trying to practice what he preaches. Your second question, which seems deeper (as you note) also seems to me to possibly involve a mistake. I'm thinking aloud here, and I'm not sticking to Bryant, so bear with me.<br /><br /> On the supposition of radical contingency <i>a la</i> Meillassoux (which is not necessarily where Bryant is coming from), certainly "no worldview is necessary," in any ontological sense. But there are two senses in which (I think) one may still legitimately use the word. First, given a (ultimately ungrounded) set of laws, such laws can necessitate a worldview. Set up your universe with in such a way that all creatures can only see the red wavelength of light and you can predict certain things about their umwelt. If we say (as Meillassoux does) that everything is up for grabs initially, including the laws that determine "wavelengths" and the structures of organs that are sensitive to light, etc, then this gets more complicated, but the principle remains. <br /><br />Secondly, there is a normative or effective kind of "must" that says, If you want end X, you must adopt means <i>A</i>, not means <i>B</i>. This seems fairly close to what Bryant is saying, but I'm talking about the general question, not his project; as long as you have <i>any</i> project, you'll have a certain degree of necessity coming into play. A teleological project can occur as a local phenomenon within an ateleological cosmos. Or at least, this would be (I presume) the rejoinder to your objection. Brassier for instance, will perhaps say that thought can after all think the conditions of its own existence or non-existence, its own contingency, and can even say, <i>if</i> you want to think the truth, <i>then</i> think <b><i>this</i></b>! <br /><br />The difficulty, I believe, arises in a related but different quarter. It is that, on the radical naturalist's premises, any thought is a <i>thing</i> and no different from any other thing. This is the Laruellean contention, and (insofar as I understand him) Laruelle is notable for following this premise through, though I believe it really is just entailed by naturalism <i>per se</i> (except of course that Laruelle would want to say that "naturalism" is still a function of the "philosophical decision," I suspect). But I do not see what it means to call a thing <i>qua</i> thing "true." That is to say, "flat" ontology cannot support the normativity one needs for truth-claims (let alone for other value-claims). This may have been what you were getting at. But of course here we are moving into deeper waters.skholiasthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-43401841832887829992012-11-08T07:40:27.250-08:002012-11-08T07:40:27.250-08:00I talk about "why bother?" here: http://...I talk about "why bother?" here: http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2012/11/07/a-one-sided-debate-is-not-a-monologue-charity-towardstouchy-and-edgy-intercesseurs/<br />It does contain the grudging compliment that Bryant gets me thinking, even if it is not what he wants me to think.Terence Blakehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14936707523015565137noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-36473151706929373292012-11-08T04:23:56.644-08:002012-11-08T04:23:56.644-08:00When I wrote that, "You can't just say th...When I wrote that, "You can't just say that the humanities will become irrelevant without naturalism if you aren't actively enlivening the humanities with said naturalism," I think I overstated my case a bit. Of course Levi is trying to do just that, and I think he is succeeding. However, it often seems like we are being told that we must, for example, take neurology, biology, etc. into account-- that we must reread and rewrite Kant, Husserl, etc. in light of the insights of these sciences-- due to the sheer fact that materialism is the only "right" view of things <i>de facto</i>. But it comes back to that age-old distinction between showing and telling. I'd much rather be shown <i>how</i> naturalism can contribute in these ways than told that it can and should. DOING the thing is much better than telling us that we SHOULD do it. And again, I think Levi DOES DO the thing (better than most). It's just that, at times, I wish he wouldn't waste his time telling others that they, also, have to do it.<br /><br />Tim.fragilekeys.comhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07945608366871667839noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-12912819028583632932012-11-07T20:20:20.234-08:002012-11-07T20:20:20.234-08:00I am not generally in sympathy with the kind of na...I am not generally in sympathy with the kind of naturalism Bryant advocates, but I'm generally willing to give it a listen - until it starts becoming the kind of dogma that refuses to give anything else a listen. Then, why bother? Amodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15978621252917667363noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-58920165029643447432012-11-07T02:08:08.585-08:002012-11-07T02:08:08.585-08:00Levi's tendency is often to advance a position...Levi's tendency is often to advance a position by polemical means, deliberately inciting misunderstandings so that he can clarify his position later and say, "Well, I didn't really mean it like that." There's also a density to his arguments that leads with bravado and (contrary to his own intentions, I think) only belatedly follows behind with an explanation of what difference it makes. If what is at issue is the survival of the humanities, then you have to tell the humanities why naturalism is necessary to its survival by putting that theoretical framework into practice. You can't just say that the humanities will become irrelevant without naturalism if you aren't actively enlivening the humanities with said naturalism.<br /><br />Second, and more importantly, I find something quite amiss when I'm being sold a position that is inherently ateleological while simultaneously being told that I <i>must</i> adopt this position. I genuinely do not understand how these two can jive. If my worldview or theory is meant to uncover non-necessity in nature (*the world), then my worldview or theory <i>is itself not necessary.</i> Whose innermost despair over insignificance does not confirm this <i>naturally</i>? But when the insignificance of nature is inverted into the necessity to theorized qua a "naturalized" speech, I'm tempted to say that the very core of the supposed insight is being betrayed. And so the same could be said about how "nature" is implicated in general. Of course it is true that there are biological, quantum-physical forces "underneath" everything; but I don't see how going on to <i>talk</i> about these forces necessarily puts them into play any more or less. And isn't that what Levi demands? That we <i>talk</i> about nature more than we have been? (And yet, if nature is implicated in all things and activities...?) In both cases, this naturalism that seems to want to liberate us ends up enslaving us to talking about nature. Ironically, this makes his naturalism slide into semiotics and semantics, despite itself.<br /><br />Alas, I've raised similar points for years and never get much of a hearing (somehow I become the linguistic idealist!), so I'll dump my objection here and not directly to Levi (my apologies).<br /><br />I'm content to admit the lack of any MUST be and to have my work condemned to fire by the famous philosopher "if need be." Worse fates than irrelevance could be imagined.<br /><br />Tim.fragilekeys.comhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07945608366871667839noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-80638631489547112412012-11-01T18:04:45.958-07:002012-11-01T18:04:45.958-07:00om.,
in some ways I'm quite sympathetic to th...om.,<br /><br />in some ways I'm quite sympathetic to this though. The bottom line of L.B.'s naturalism is still a rejection of anything but effective causation and No teleology neither, please, we're materialists. And this is enough for me to reject it. But I don't mind the re-definition, for in fact I might have to embark on the same infinite series of qualifications if someone asked me what I meant by teleology, or indeed "supernaturalism." I don't believe that just because one winds up dialectically saying "not this, not that," that one's commitments must necessarily undergo the death of a thousand cuts. The same things happens with friendship or piety or knowledge in the Platonic dialogues, and yet I don't concede that one comes away from these skeptical as to the <i>existence</i> of friendship or piety or etc. <br /><br />Bryant I believe has some grounds for insisting that he is not "reductionist," and in fact one of the things that his more uncompromising critics (e.g. Terrence's comment above, and number of his follow-up posts reproach him for is that he tries to smuggle "his version" of naturalishim into his argument against the non-naturalist, so that <i>any</i> anti- anti-naturalist must willy-nilly subscribe to <i>his</i> (Bryant's) version. <br /><br />Having said all that, I would have to read Bryant's several follow-up posts carefully before I concluded one way or the other. But my instinct and preference is always to be charitable and conclude that the problem if any is with presentation and not with mere "incoherence". skholiasthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-28180566897934234862012-11-01T10:47:22.264-07:002012-11-01T10:47:22.264-07:00I note that we are comforted in the follow up post...I note that we are comforted in the follow up posts after the fashion of Prufrock:<br /><br />If one, settling a pillow by her head, <br /> Should say, "That is not what I meant at all. <br /> That is not it, at all." <br /><br />It seems that naturalism is not what we took it to be but has morphed into ‘something rich and strange’.ombhurbhuvahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07789523088428270027noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-33711127453405286412012-10-30T18:00:25.108-07:002012-10-30T18:00:25.108-07:00Matt,
I was actually wondering what you in partic...Matt,<br /><br />I was actually wondering what you in particular would make of it. skholiasthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-91406784933365877852012-10-30T17:33:30.106-07:002012-10-30T17:33:30.106-07:00Very well put. I'm resisting the urge to respo...Very well put. I'm resisting the urge to respond to Bryant's provocation... we'll see if I succeed or not. <br /><br />-MattMatthew T. Segallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09094870514161016656noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-53457882660799854512012-10-29T09:44:00.483-07:002012-10-29T09:44:00.483-07:00Terence,
welcome and thank you.
What you sugges...<br />Terence, <br /><br />welcome and thank you.<br /><br />What you suggest as re. Bryant's rhetoric may or may not be the case. (And from your presentation here I cannot tell where your analysis ends and your suspicions begin.) As I said in response to Jason, it isn't my business to analyze those motives here; but actually I suspect Bryant would be willing to countenance many forms of naturalism (beyond OOO), though of course he'll want to argue for his forms and perhaps also argue that other forms retain vestigial (at least) commitments to non-naturalism. In any case, as a semi-Tillichian myself, I can't very well have objections to theological language <i>per se</i>! Though of course I could object if it isn't owned up to. That would be a further analysis that I expressly did not undertake. <br /><br />I must, however, give you that "Block naturalism" is a good phrase.skholiasthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-67794888092254731032012-10-29T09:06:30.630-07:002012-10-29T09:06:30.630-07:00I agree with your rhetorical analysis as far as it...I agree with your rhetorical analysis as far as it goes, and that Bryant sets up a double-bind which makes the discussion unwinnable for the non-naturalist who enters into its terms. This is the sort of "heads I win tails you lose" situation that Deleuze analysed as typical of intellectual discussion (in tne first part of DIALOGUES)and that he called the logic of the forced choice. But I think that there is a second double-bind and a second forced choice that I find more worrisome. That is the implication that if you are against anti-naturalism you must be in favour of naturalism as he, Levi Bryant, presents it. Now Levi uses Heidegggerian, and implicitly Tillichian, language to define naturalism: the naturalist is defined as "choosing nature...as the ground of being". This is theological language indeed, in the adulterated sense in which one uses theological as a shorthand for ontotheological. The only alternative he considers is the "obscurantist gesture" of those who recoil from this "naturalist revolution" (and I agree with thedescribe above that where he says "revolution" Bryant means conversion). The list of obscurantists he cites (Hegel, Marx, Merleau-Ponty, structuralism and post-structuralism, Foucault, Gadamer are all naturalists (or at least compatible with naturalism)! Even Hegel can be given a naturalistic interpretation. The difference with Bryant's block naturalism is that they think that nature is itself a concept that needs to be analysed and not just waved around as a flag. Bryant's coup de force is to trick the anti-anti-naturalists into swallowing as a block his naturalism and into seeing rival naturalists as anti-naturalists. This is the anxiety of influence with a vengeance. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-22097750585341043622012-10-28T22:01:28.636-07:002012-10-28T22:01:28.636-07:00Yes, I could have made a distinction between the p...Yes, I could have made a distinction between the pragmatists and the neo-pragmatists, I suppose. Let alone the pragmaticists! In any case, I too enjoyed reading Rorty -- especially <i>Contingency, Irony, Solidarity</i>, which was a very significant book for me once upon a time -- even though I certainly find huge swathes of his project problematic. He tends to shrug for the wrong reasons. (Socrates shrugs too, but cannot rest content with that.) I like very much the spirit of what you say about the way means become ends, though I'd want to think about it before I fully endorsed it. As to Bryant's "ends," I don't think I should speculate, given that I am so clearly out of sympathy with his means (at least in the post in question, which is all I am addressing here.) But I am very intentionally restricting myself to this single rhetorical move of setting up an unwinnable situation for non-naturalists here, and am not addressing things like his general style, which, while I acknowledge it comes off as irascible and defensive in places (I know what Ombhurbhuva is talking about when he mentions the "embattled tone," etc), is precisely not what I get to [psycho]analyze given that I've just written a long critique of scrutinizing motives. Not that I think this cannot be done in a responsible way -- but it would be a whole other post, and I'm not sure i want to put that much energy there. skholiasthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-4097409782824292762012-10-28T11:58:07.495-07:002012-10-28T11:58:07.495-07:00p.s. I love Rorty's style, and I accept it bec...p.s. I love Rorty's style, and I accept it because I believe his ends are good and just, and his practical means acceptable. Reading Rorty is one of the reasons why I became a philosopher, even if I do not accept some of his premises. I am not convinced that Bryant shares these ends precisely because of what he uses his rhetorical moves for, how he executes them, and how he treats his interlocutors in the process. As any pragmatist knows, the means are not divorced from the ends, for the means become the ends, and thus the same stated ends by less than gracious means are the same in name only.khadimirhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12960757465883819380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-58036977847286611702012-10-28T11:50:35.991-07:002012-10-28T11:50:35.991-07:00Interesting. I would add that you are not precisel...Interesting. I would add that you are not precisely identifying "pragmatist," which I bring up precisely because the term is often used in a derogatory way even though its reference-in-use is usually Rortian or neo-analytic and not classical or neo-classical pragmatism. Us classicals and neo-classicals would like to be known for our own merits and not for those of our cousins. All that said, yes, Bryant is very Rortian, especially in his synthesis of philosophy and rhetoric as something integrated rather than at odds as it commonly is.khadimirhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12960757465883819380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-91687220912239388172012-10-28T07:58:03.649-07:002012-10-28T07:58:03.649-07:00Bryant’s bulla seems to me to be the expression of...Bryant’s bulla seems to me to be the expression of a flatland philosophy or ‘nothing buttery’ in which a principle that is useful at a certain level is made to apply to ALAQ as the man said. The embattled tone of his posts, that of a Gulliver beset by Lilliputians, is tiresome. Besides I’ve always felt that his philosophy had many points of similarity with the Continental M.O. There is a glossary of arcane terms which you have to learn to be able to read it and the effort that is put into this period of ontological boot camp leaves the aspirant unable to see the world but through those ‘spectacles’.ombhurbhuvahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07789523088428270027noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-65289950451120338052012-10-28T06:48:29.351-07:002012-10-28T06:48:29.351-07:00Thanks for this response. I read that post as wel...Thanks for this response. I read that post as well and tried to sit with what he was saying. All I could come up with was that I would need to wait for some conversion experience to enter into the vision he was promoting. And, again, perhaps that was part of the point. It forced me to look at how I understand and hold fundamental postures.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com