tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post7710888456485960607..comments2024-01-05T01:21:21.702-08:00Comments on <center>SPECULUM CRITICUM TRADITIONIS</center>: Owen Barfield (part 1: participation & correlation)skholiasthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-50035073161702041782010-08-23T23:07:44.246-07:002010-08-23T23:07:44.246-07:00Indeed, Barfield is very tough. I don't discus...Indeed, Barfield is very tough. I don't discuss him much precisely because I'm still working through much of his ideas - many supplemental readings. However, on this arche-fossil point he's pretty explicit in <i>World's Apart</i> that it need not be self-conscious man. The only caveat being that Barfield does seem to argue that man has been evolving from the very beginning - i.e unconsciously. As if a child in the womb of nature. In the same way a child develops from unconscious fetus to a self-conscious being, Barfield suggests that humanity as a whole has been developing from an unconscious state to a self-conscious one.<br /><br /><br /> I'll try and say some more things later on in the week. Your second post seems fantastic. Too many "friends of Barfield" are uncritical or mute on certain points, becoming proselytizers rather than philosophers. Good to see someone else wrestling with his ideas.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-43378488358382135652010-08-23T21:44:36.065-07:002010-08-23T21:44:36.065-07:00chenroy,
thanks and welcome.
Barfield's was ...chenroy,<br /><br />thanks and welcome.<br /><br />Barfield's was ahead of Meillassoux, no question, but of course precedent-mongering is not my point. I have however been somewhat surprised that few others seem to be as struck by it as myself. Of course, it may simply be that there are not many who are interested in both thinkers, but (as you yourself confirm), I am certainly not <i>so</i> idiosyncratic. <br /><br />I do think that Meillassoux is aware that there is an Idealist response to his critique, or rather, that Idealism in a certain sense escapes it, since Meillassoux distinguishes between strong correlationism and idealism. I am actually less sanguine on this point myself. Barfield is hard to read here, and I am not sure I follow him While, at least in <i>StA</i>, he is explicit in not making a metaphysical argument along Berkeley's lines, it's clear that his position derives from his reading of romanticism (though he wants to see it "come of age," and thinks that failing this it will just turn decadent), and the connection between romanticism and idealism, esp. in Coleridge, is clear enough in outline. <br /><br />I don't know how evident it is, but insofar as I am a fellow-traveler among Speculative Realists, you see me trying to wend a middle course between Harman's pan/polypsychism (which I think does have some interesting possible overlap with Barfield's idealism) and Meillassoux insofar as he actually has respect for correlationism and wants to push it further (til it inverts), rather than Harman's near-disdain. In any case, I am very glad you see the point about Barfield making the arche-fossil not a bug but a feature.skholiasthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-31405154541527966722010-08-23T20:28:06.507-07:002010-08-23T20:28:06.507-07:00For Barfield's part, the correlationists that ...For Barfield's part, the correlationists that feel the sting of Meillassoux arguments are <br />suffering from what he calls the "Residue of Unresolved Positivism." http://davidlavery.net/barfield/encyclopedia_barfieldiana/lexicon/rup.html<br />That is, they have logically abandoned positivism and even materialism but they have not gone far enough - they still harbor beliefs that prevent them from truly moving beyond it. <br /><br />If they were to truly be free of RUP they would reject the idea that the arche-fossil existed in only a material sense and argue forcefully, as Barfield does, that mind preceded matter. Or, at the very least, correlative to its development. It's here that we can note a certain lack of imagination in Meillassoux arguments when we pit him against Barfield. Barfield, after all, is convinced of the evolution of consciousness and has no problem arguing that selfconsciousness, for example, is a [i]late[/i] development for humanity as a whole. So if self-consciousness is a late development, what was before? How could one still remain a correlationist when ceding the emergence of consciuosnes or mind? But is the concept of consciousness or mind regulated only to self-consciousness? Obviously not, otherwise the concept of the unconscious, subconscious, or even self-consciousnes would not make much sense. That is, there are degrees of consciousness. The mistake of Meillassoux is to think that a correlationist must argue in such a way as to suggest that the world is correlated to a self-conscious perceiver and not to consciousness as such.The arche-fossil itself may exist without self-conscious perceivers but by that fact alone is not thereby independent of mind altogether. <br /><br />If the correlationist were to take this tact, Meillassoux's argument does not have much of an effect. It would, however, force the correlationist into some rather deep and radical waters which many simply are not prepared to traverse - it would involve no less than a new intepretation of the "facts" the physical sciences. Meillassoux's argument works precisely because he aligns himself with science and most people today assume that to align themselves with the scientific spirit is to accept scientific materialism. Thus, he can readily and accurately charge correlationists with talking out of both sides of their mouths so long as they want to accept as uncritically as he does the arche-fossil in a purely material sense - in so far as it is assumed by all parties that matter preceded mind, Meillassoux will have the upper hand on most of his targets. Barfield, however, does not accept this and takes the debate to a much higher level. Albeit, as his custom, he can be dismissed out of hand so OOO can go on like they are currently ( taking for granted many things Barfield calls into question). But it need not be the case.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-62434839870763736972010-08-23T15:45:20.848-07:002010-08-23T15:45:20.848-07:00This is an absolutely crazy coincidence. I'm a...This is an absolutely crazy coincidence. I'm a Barfieldian in some respects and read After Finitude in just the same way as you did. I thought I was the only one on the internet that knew of Barfield but had interest in contemporary philosophers. Most "friends of Barfield" are talking about Michealic beings and whatever else and not coming down to earth with folks that just find his ideas intriguing, interesting enough to meditate on and develop. One can be dispassionate about these subjects as well despite their "weirdness." <br /><br />Anyway, I thought the first few chapters of Meillassoux's book could be read as a direct response to Barfield whether Meillassoux knew of him or not. And vice versa, I think Barfield's arguments are a direct challenge to what Meillassoux argues. If I ever get the chance, I plan to write an essay pitting the two against each other. Barfield will win though! <br /><br />Why? Well, the fundamental problem with Meillassoux starting point is his unquestioned acceptance of the "arce-fossil" as exclusively material. Meillassoux's arguments are very strong against correlationists that share his assumption and predilection for materialism - and the history of the world it entails - but not for others who reject it. His argument is similar to the argument that there cannot be a non-reductive physicalism. Many physicalists don't want to be associated with the seemingly absurd theories of hardcore reductionists and eliminativists so they try to tightrope a materialism that does "justice" to the mental. However, Jaegwon Kim has convincingly argued that this cannot be done. Similarly, many correlationists do not want to contradict or want to seem in conflict with the standard scientific accounts of the history of our universe and thus attempt a "two-step" philosophy in order to square the implications of what they're saying with standard accounts. Quentin Meillassoux deftly shows that this cannot be done, forcing the correlationists who share his assumptions and understanding of realism to either abandon their correlationism or state plain and accept the consequences of what they're saying.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-59788541550294201602010-07-19T12:52:33.880-07:002010-07-19T12:52:33.880-07:00o~~ My (corrigible) impression is that Barfield mi...o~~ My (corrigible) impression is that Barfield might say that original participation, at least in the "common" person, was anciently conscious, but unaware that it <i>construed</i> (or, as you say, distorted) its objects. Indeed, one might say that the awareness of this distorting effect went hand-in-hand with the critique of the very idea of participation, the rise of the dream of the objects unproblematically presented. While Barfield clearly has a correlationist bias, I think his notion of participation may be salvageable, e.g. via the Latourian move that sees <i>every</i> interaction as a kind of construal. <br /><br />Barfield acknowledges that Locke's distinctions have made for a certain progress. He thinks that original participation either <i>needed</i> to be, or at least was inevitably going to be, let go. He sees the scientific revolution (with its roots in Greece), paired with the parallel (but very different) Hebrew critique of the idols,as a kind of purification, after which a sort of new and improved participation can flower. Perhaps this "final" participation would be aware of the way it "distorted," and able to course-correct, as it were.<br /><br />How much this might intersect with such Zen accounts of thusness is not quite clear to me. I think he thinks of thusness as the <i>unrepresented</i>, and towards the end of <i>SA</i> there are speculations that the unrepresented itself might become phenomena. <br /><br /><i>Saving the Appearances</i> is an essential read for anyone interested in perennialism. It isn't just a rehash of Guenon and Schuon--it starts independently of them and it goes in new directions--but it's coherent and (potentially) of a piece with this strain of philosophy.skholiasthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-86761540830517997322010-07-19T09:15:56.237-07:002010-07-19T09:15:56.237-07:00What you say about Barfield and correlationism rai...What you say about Barfield and correlationism raises the question about the deep sources of ancient forms of realism and the general shape of the answer to the question: What is the nature of the object such that the mental aspect of our interaction with it does not differ from its reality? As has been said, we see through our ideas and the default assumption is that this 'gauze' is not a distorting medium. We participate directly in the life of the object.<br /><br />Does Barfield hold that focusing on the representation in the Lockean way is a sterile form of life preventing the reality of the object from manifesting itself? One thinks of the Zen concept of 'tzujan' or selfso-ness.<br /><br />Clearly I must read <i>Saving</i>.ombhurbhuvahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07789523088428270027noreply@blogger.com