tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post6104880437456328943..comments2024-01-05T01:21:21.702-08:00Comments on <center>SPECULUM CRITICUM TRADITIONIS</center>: Responsaskholiasthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-45473929635521375912010-05-28T13:03:15.936-07:002010-05-28T13:03:15.936-07:00Mikhail,
I defer to your more intimate knowledge ...Mikhail,<br /><br />I defer to your more intimate knowledge of the debate.<br /><br />I've been reading from the various new "movements" in philosophy of late and am still such a novice that I'm taking it mostly at face value. Reading the back and forth on the various blogs I am reminded of when I was an undergraduate thinking about going to graduate school in the classics. A kindly professor cautioned me that in such a field if you come up with anything new you are probably wrong or not well enough read. It seem to me that you are accusing the new realists of just such an error. Perhaps the only way one can "make it new" as Harman is trying to do is misread or neglect the great earlier thinkers. I'm far from being able to make an informed decision on that. But the discussion has got me interested. I think I'll be a lurker on your Maimon reading group--assuming I can get a copy quickly.dy0geneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12265699357881251867noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-79304565833237391432010-05-23T16:46:02.855-07:002010-05-23T16:46:02.855-07:00Well, if what is taking place is "just specul...Well, if what is taking place is "just speculation" and it's a kind of "live and let live" attitude, then I'm totally fine with it, but that's not the case, if you read Harman/Bryant - it's never put in such terms, I know it because if it was, I'd be the first to concede that I have no right to demand any explanation or justifications from such speculations, even though speculations also obey rules and therefore can be assessed as legitimate or illegitimate.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-60288124187462133902010-05-22T09:02:47.392-07:002010-05-22T09:02:47.392-07:00I am torn like one of Harman's objects between...I am torn like one of Harman's objects between Mikhail and dy0genes here, as I feel strongly about the issues and yet at the end of the day I have a mental shrug that is not "who cares?" nor even "who knows?" but some synthesis of <i>"of the making of many books there is no end,"</i> and <i>"For His Mercy Endures Forever."</i> If this be correlationism, so be it. <br /><br />As to Mikhail's points, the only one I really can address here is the hierarchy thing. I didn't mean to attribute this to Kant. What I meant was that there are some schema according to which ontology precedes epistemology (a thing must first be in order for it to be known), or vice-versa (in order to do ontology you must first do epistemology); I simply see these two projects as entwined in a back-&-forth (Merleau-Ponty said 'chiasm') in which one generates insight by the friction between the two. This description of mine is, I know, more of a poem (and maybe a poor one) than a serious account of a project. Ontology always accompanies epistemology, and vice-versa-- yes-- but this is itself an epistemological assertion, and this again just smacks of ye olde subjectivism, even idealism. There are however ways around this impasse. I don't think we can dispense with Kant, and both the counter-enightenment (Herder, Haman, Jacobi) and later idealists' (esp. Hegel and Schelling) response appeals to me precisely because it stages a critique that is both external and immanent. I'm looking forward to the Maimon reading group for this reason.skholiasthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-42790454719934632172010-05-22T07:57:30.383-07:002010-05-22T07:57:30.383-07:00I hesitate a little to jump into this because it l...I hesitate a little to jump into this because it looks like an internecine war. I'm no philosopher but I enjoy reading it in much the same way I like to listen to Jazz. I'm not expecting to find any "Truth" in philosophy, or at least no truth greater than what I hear in music. Harman sometimes ruffles my feathers a bit but I think that's sort of his job. I'm inclined to let somebody working under the banner of "speculative" to have a pretty free rein to follow his thoughts to their conclusions. Maybe he is just making stuff up but that has been pretty successful in many other fields of study. Einstein's famous thought experiments were widely dismissed until years later. Let's let the guy finish his project and then, just like the TV, we can turn the channel if we don't like it.dy0geneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12265699357881251867noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-7948996740159922952010-05-20T20:40:49.983-07:002010-05-20T20:40:49.983-07:00You write:
[note added later: agree, yes, but wi...You write: <br /><br />[note added later: agree, yes, but with reservations--I would keep the distinction but not the hierarchical relationship]<br /><br />Sorry about three comments in a row but these blogspot comment sections are so tiny, I make 10 spelling mistakes in 3 sentences and can't see the whole comment. <br /><br />I'm assuming you refer to the idea that epistemology comes first before any ontology and in this way higher up the hierarchical level. I've heard this often from Bryant in the past - as if epistemology is a first necessary step for any philosophical project and one cannot do without it. I'm not sure where he or you are taking this hierarchy, but it's certainly not something you find in Kant (I'd be very interested to see where he would say anything like that). It's not as though, to use this simple example, we need to understand the nature of eyesight before we can ever see, or we need to think about the conditions of our enjoyment of music before we can enjoy it. There's where Kant's notion of "transcendental" is essential - if you read any of the prefaces to the first Critique, you can clearly see that the issue is not that we must first do epistemology and only then do ontology, the issue is that we've been doing ontology for centuries and all we have is a pile of contradictory projects - we can either pile up some more, or attempt to sort this mess out. What is ignored in Kant in the objectological circles is the importance of the transcendental illusion (I know, I know, it's in the latter sections of the first Critique - no one reads that book that far) - that is of our natural tendency to speculate and to go beyond the limits of true knowledge, to make shit up, as we could put it. So epistemology is not a required step, not a necessary hoop to jump through so that we can then, having passed the tedious exam, make as much stuff up as we please - you don't stop doing epistemology while you do ontology because you make statements that you claim are true, you produce knowledge and if a simple "How do you know that?" is a question that throws you for a loop (like it does with Bryant), then you're not doing philosophy, you're doing a lot of talking out of your ass (which is great, of course, when it comes to other human pursuits) - hope this makes sense...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-16104993164356795362010-05-20T20:20:44.010-07:002010-05-20T20:20:44.010-07:00Let me just say that, unlike what I perceive happe...Let me just say that, unlike what I perceive happening in the objectology circles, Kant has a very detailed and very subtle argument why there cannot be any real distinction between epistemology and ontology, or to put it differently, why any distinction between epistemology and ontology after Kant is a completely different sort of distinction. No one is saying we shouldn't distinguish between issues of conditions of knowledge and, say, being and existence - I say distinguish away - the point is that this is a necessarily post-Kantian distinction. One must address Kant's argument by proving it wrong (which is what genuine reactions to Kant early on were and what might be considered as a motivation behind German Idealism, an overcoming of Kant, in other words) - no one does that, I say, no one, even Meillassoux. And saying things like "If we accept that Kant was write, we can't do X, Y, and Z" is moronic - that's not an argument, that's just a statement of inconvenience. It's like saying "Darn, I wish I could have the cake and eat it too, stupid laws of physics!" The second reaction to Kant's argument is to ignore it - in this case simply mentioning Kant does not mean anything, one can still mention Kant on every page and yet ignore his philosophical contributions. A lot of these issues will come up in our upcoming reading of Maimon (sorry for the plug-in)...<br /><br />And finally, okay, fine, let's distinguish epistemology and ontology, let's say, I don't want to explain HOW I know that objects withdraw or that my toy soldiers come alive as soon as I fall asleep, I just DO, can I go now and construct my ontology? - is this really what we call philosophy? Let's say Harman's and Bryant's ontologies are beautiful and elegant (and smell of lilacs), how are we supposed to evaluate them and compare them to other ontologies? (Notice, say, Bryant's favorite turn of phrase "Well, in MY ontology things are this way") By how elegant they are or by wherever they have any reference to the world out there? That's the fundamental frustration I and many others have with these poetic exercises - are we simply dealing with beautiful combinations of words and we should just enjoy them? If so, why pretend to do philosophy, not just announce that you are a writer? And all of this under the umbrella of realism (as in REALISM) - am I going mad?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-62178916810039667892010-05-20T20:01:28.769-07:002010-05-20T20:01:28.769-07:00Thanks for a nice post, let me get this bit out of...Thanks for a nice post, let me get this bit out of the way - Harman writes: <br /><br />"As for people saying that the ontology/epistemology divide is dead after Kant, this reminds of Rorty’s sarcastic remark that 'it turns out that what’s beyond realism and idealism is– idealism!'"<br /><br />Can I just say this? This remark reminds me of what I just said a minute ago when I first read it - "What the fuck does this suppose to mean?" (Sorry about the swearing, but I must faithfully quote myself). How does citing some not funny joke explain anything? In fact, this perfectly illustrates my previous point about Harman/Bryant ignoring serious issues because they came up with some clever saying or a poetic metaphor. <br /><br />[I'm putting this as a separate comment as to not confuse it with the essential reaction to your points]Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-87097935956324253842010-05-20T09:57:11.983-07:002010-05-20T09:57:11.983-07:00Michael, thanks, and welcome. This will probably c...Michael, thanks, and welcome. This will probably come down, at the end of the day, to questions of nuance and emphasis, at least for me: "It only <i>seems</i>..." versus "it <i>damn well</i> seems..."; "talk <i>about</i> the real world" vs. "talk about the <i>real</i> world." While I am quite sympathetic to Rorty's pragmatic call to "persuade your peers, and let the truth take care of itself," I still feel that something essential is lost from the philosophical enterprise if we let go of what Harman refers to as the realist impulse behind our urge to persuade. It is, so to speak, not pragmatic to be merely pragmatist. (I am still thinking about whether/how this lands us in a paradox of sorts.) Our practice always points beyond itself.skholiasthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-65270564996725468102010-05-20T07:25:24.680-07:002010-05-20T07:25:24.680-07:00Please note that Graham Harman has responded again...Please note that Graham Harman has <a href="http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2010/05/20/response-from-speculum-criticum-traditionis/" rel="nofollow">responded again</a>. He makes me eager to see <i>The Quadruple Object</i> in print, as he promises a more full treatment of correlationism. I will probably have more to say on this (when do I not?...) but for now I want to thank him for noting the effort at a reasonable <i>tone</i> (even if I don't succeed, this is almost always an object for me, and precisely a philosophical object), and for responding in kind--even (or especially) if he quarrels with the content.skholiasthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05410057905377189336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1651908162607091292.post-84665583227023706862010-05-19T22:38:01.373-07:002010-05-19T22:38:01.373-07:00I found your exchange re: Harman’s definition very...I found your exchange re: Harman’s definition very fascinating. And I would question the assumed discrepancy between how you characterized Harman’s definition of philosophy and what Harman calls his “realist impetus” – because the point of contact between both views is the move to render existing frameworks “obsolete”. And this movement, or at least the seeking out of a method, reveals an unmistakably pragmatic drive motivated by 1) a recognition of the partiality of all supposed truth, and 2) a willful reconstruction of new, more useful or productive partial truths to replace them. <br /><br />And this pragmatic 'will to speculation' speaks to an even deeper cognitive orientation that implicitly adopts a philosophical attitude that not only Rorty may have agreed with, but also Wittgenstein and Nietzsche too; namely, that our vocabularies, language games and conceptualizations only ever speak <i><b>about </b></i>the real world, while the Real continues to exist in itself.Michael-https://www.blogger.com/profile/17137291506357159071noreply@blogger.com