Future, Present, & Past:

~~ Giving itself latitude and leisure to take any premise or inquiry to its furthest associative conclusion.
Critical~~ Ready to apply, to itself and its object, the canons of reason, evidence, style, and ethics, up to their limits.
Traditional~~ At home and at large in the ecosystem of practice and memory that radically nourishes the whole person.

Oυδεὶς άμουσος εἰσίτω

Friday, December 28, 2012

Kant, still

A few years ago I wrote a very, very short review of Kant's philosophy -- not at all a summary or a précis, but what I hoped was a provocation to ordinary readers (that is, not those who usually self-identify as philosophers) to give him a try. I had in mind especially three shorter works -- the Prolegomena, the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, and (in some ways my favorite) the early Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime; I wrote there that
these works by Kant exhibit the absolute rigor and confidence of hard thinking. Reading them slowly, one almost recaptures the sense that, if the difficulties are simply thought through to the end, even the most immovable problems will yield to the irresistible force of the mind.
David Milliern has posted a welcome encomium on Immanuel Kant, where he admittedly does pretty much the same thing, but with more detail, more emphasis on the epistemology and natural philosophy, and expressly talking to philosophers. Milliern's praise may seem over-the-top--
in my opinion, far and away, the greatest thinker of all-time — and I mean it isn’t even close
--but I find this welcome, I say, given the reaction among some philosophers against Kant. This reaction has arisen largely in the wake of Meillassoux, whose critique of Kant is really a critique of a particular reading -- Meillassoux's reading -- of Kant, but because of the geniality and ingenuity with which Meillassoux makes it, the critique has caught on. On the other hand, there is Žižek's "Kant was the first philosopher" line, which like so much in Žižek overstates in order to provoke, and I read Milliern's enthusiasm in the same way, though he'd probably protest that he means it absolutely literally.

I deeply admire Meillassoux, and I spend more time than I like to admit arguing with him in my mind; but for all the talk about reversing the "Ptolemaic counter-revolution," I will bet anyone who dares to take me up on it that as the dust settles and people stop using "correlationist" as a swear-word, there will be more than one proposed synthesis of Kant and Meillassoux (or indeed of your Speculative Realist of choice). I note, for instance, that Kant singles out three questions -- the reality of free will, the existence of God, and the possibility of immortality -- as crucial to moral philosophy (and I am one for whom this is the centerpiece of his thinking in general). Very few major thinkers have seriously addressed immortality the way Kant did, and back when I first studied him I even thought he was making a kind of category mistake. But I've come to understand since then. And one of the signs that Meillassoux is the real thing is that the more you read him the more you realize that his thinking begins and ends with this very same issue. (There is a sense in which Meillassoux is Kant modulated into a new key: read the concerns about Ancestrality as the starry heavens, and the concerns about the world of justice as the moral law.)

As a Platonist, I'm on the ancients' side whenever I can be, but when I have to be a modern (and of course I do) I am (in certain crucial ways that have to do with the thematization of finitude) Kantian. Millierd prefaces his post with that famous remark of Kant about moral law and the starry heavens. I know this is over-quoted, like the first bars of Eine kleine Nachtmusik, but I don't care -- it really is gorgeous and as fine a one-sentence summary of philosophy itself as one could ask for -- and it is also (and not coincidentally) one of the places where Kant's kinship with Plato is most apparent. And with Meillassoux, now that I think of it.